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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
 Review, of. the Literature .. • •..  — -----  ~
Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory states that 
two elements of knowledge “are in dissonant relation if, 
considering these two alone, the obverse of one element 
would follow from the other” (Festinger, 1957* P* 3-3)*
The theory further hypothesizes that dissonance is psy­
chologically uncomfortable, so that experiencing too much 
dissonance results in an attempt to reduce dissonance by 
changing one of the dissonant elements of knowledge* Thus, 
individuals strive to maintain consonance.
If the quality of performance on a task is not con­
sonant with the expected quality of performance on that task 
then a state of dissonance will exist, and dissonance theory 
implies that subjects will attempt to reduce dissonance.
If expectancies in such a case are strong, then subjects 
might be motivated to avoid any performance not consistent 
with those expectancies, or to change any dissonant per­
formance. If subject’s performance on a task does not 
match his strong expectancy, then dissonance theory implies 
that, if given a chance to change that performance, the 
subject would change the performance so that it matched his 
expectancy.
Consider the following paradigm. Two groups are led 
to develop strong expectancies (either high or low) about 
the quality of their performance on a task. Then half 
of each group is led to believe that their last performance 
was high in quality, while the other half of each group 
is led to believe that their last performance was low in 
quality. There are two groups in a consonant situation 
(i.e., high expectancy-high performance and low expectancy- 
low performance) and two groups in a dissonant situation 
(i.e., high expectancy-low performance and low expectancy- 
high performance). If all subjects are given a chance to 
change their last performance, dissonance theory would pre­
dict that the high expectancy-low performance group will 
change the performance more than the high expectancy-high 
performance group, and that the low expectancy-high per­
formance group will change the performance more than the 
low expectancy-low performance group. The former prediction 
can be explained by hypothesizing that subjects were achieve­
ment motivated, while the latter prediction is in direct 
opposition to any prediction based upon achievement moti­
vation.
Dissonance theory also implies that the following dif 
ferences would be found in such a paradigms high expectancy- 
low performance subjects should make a greater change in 
performance than low expectancy-low performance subjects, 
and low expectancy-high performance subjects should change 
performance more than high expectancy-high performance sub-
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jects. Clearly, the latter difference cannot be explained 
in terms of achievement motivation, since low expectancy- 
high performance subjects would be changing a superior per­
formance. A dissonance reduction interpretation could be
.. applied to this difference .— Considering-the—former—dif-**—  ----
ference, while the behavior of both groups could be con­
sidered to be achievement motivated (i.e., each group would 
appear to be attempting to improve their performance.), fhe 
difference in change of performance between the groups can­
not readily be explained in terms of achievement motivation 
„ alone. This difference in change of performance can be ex­
plained by assuming that high expectancy-low performance
subjects were'additionally motivated to change their per-
*
formances because of dissonance. Thus, each of the above 
differences can be interpreted as evidence that subjects were 
motivated to reduce dissonance.
The difference that low expectancy-high performance 
subjects change their performances to a greater extent than 
do low expectancy-low performance subjects will be hence­
forth referred to as a "strong" difference. The other dif­
ferences which are supportive of a dissonance interpretation 
(i.e., low expectancy-high performance subjects changing 
their performances to a greater extent than high expectancy- 
high performance subjects, and high expectancy-low per­
formance subjects changing their performances to a greater 
extent than low expectancy-low performance subjects) will 
be referred to as "weak" differences. At present, the terms.
"strong" and "weak" should be regarded as arbitrary labels 
having no further implications. The reason for the choice of 
these labels will be discussed later.
The differences discussed above are summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1
Some Hypothetical Differences in a 2x2 Ex­
perimental Design with Expectancy and 
Performance Variables
Difference Interpretation -----
High expectancy-low perfor­
mance change greater than 
high expectancy-high perfor­
mance change - ’
Achievement motivation or 
dissonance reduction moti­
vation.
Low expectancy-high perfor­
mance change greater than 
low expectancy-low perfor­
mance change("strong")
Dissonance reduction moti­
vation (Achievement moti-. 
vation implies the opposite.
Low expectancy-high perfor­
mance change greater than 
high expectancy-high perfor­
mance change("weak")
Dissonance reduction moti­
vation (Achievement moti­
vation implies no dif­
ference. )
High expectancy-low perfor­
mance change greater than 
low expectancy-low perfor­
mance change("weak")
Dissonance reduction moti­
vation (Achievement moti­
vation implies no dif­
ference . }
In the present study, behavior was considered to be 
achievement motivated if that behavior satisfied the need to 
achieve, as defined by Hurray: "To overcome obstacles, to
exercise power, to strive to do something difficult as 
well and as quickly as possible" (1938, p. 80-81). Murray’s 
conception of achievement motivation was employed so that 
the Personality Research Form (PRF) by Jackson (1967)} 
which purports to measure the need to achieve, as conceived 
by Murray, could be used. Any attempt to improve a perfor­
mance on a task which a subject believed to be difficult 
was considered, in the present study, to be achievement 
motivated in the above sense. In the above paradigm, low 
performance subjects changing more responses than high per­
formance subjects was considered to be achievement moti-*
vated behavior.
In the-studies to be described, the experimental 
task was described to subjects as a difficult task which 
would measure their ability to understand other people. 
Attempting to improve the quality of a performance on such 
a task was considered to satisfy the need for achievement. 
There would appear to be a social or affillative quality 
in such achieving, i.e., in attempting to achieve on such 
a task, subjects would appear to be trying to establish or 
affirm a superior ability to understand others. More pre­
cisely, achieving on such an experimental task was assumed 
to be related to the need for social achievement, as con­
ceived by Murray (1938, p. 229):
The ability to make friends easily, to "get on" with 
people, to be liked and trusted. A gift for enduring 
friendships. Also the ability to express oneself in the 
presence of others; to amuse and entertain; to be popular
Since a superior ability to understand others would facil­
itate "making friends", etc. it was assumed in the present 
study that subjects with a high need for social achievement 
(as measured by the PRF) would exhibit a greater tendency to 
_achieve_ on_J;he experimental jtask (i.e., attempt to establish 
or affirm a superior ability to understand others) than 
would subjects with a low need for social achievement.
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) performed an experiment 
using the above paradigm, and obtained results compatible with 
*'a dissonance theory interpretation, Including the "strong" 
difference that the low expectancy-high performance group 
changed their performances more than the low expectancy-low 
performance group. Their subjects were 40 paid undergraduate
tfemales who were told that they were to take a series of 
short personality tests, and that the findings of these 
tests were to be correlated with the findings of later inter­
views. After a short warmup bogus personality questionnaire, 
the subjects began the experimental task, which was intro­
duced as a test of social sensitivity, i.e., the ability to 
understand others. Subjects were given cards on which there 
were three pictures of faces, and were asked to pick out 
the person that was schizophrenic. In actuality the pictures 
were randomly taken from an old college yearbook, and none 
of the people were known to be schizophrenic. Subjects 
were told that some persons do very well on the test, scoring 
as high as a>37°i while others do very poorly, scoring as low 
as 20^. Subjects were assured that the test was quite re­
liable and valid, i.e., that those who did well on the 
test were usually very socially perceptive. The test was 
administered in groups of 20 cards. After each group of 
20 cards, the experimenter reported a false number of cor­
rect responses to the subject. To the high expectancy group, 
scores of 17, 16, 16 and 17 were reported on the first 
four groups of cards, while the low expectancy group were 
given scores of 5> ^»and 5 (It might be noted that 
Cottrell (1965) has shown that this type of manipulation 
successfully produces the desired differential expectancies.). 
On the fifth group of 20 cards the experimenter announced 
that his timing device had broken down and asked the sub­
ject to score.his last group of 20 cards (in order to make 
the score for. this group appear more credible to the sub­
jects) while he “fixed" the timer. The subject was given a 
prearranged answer key and score sheet so that he received 
either consonant or dissonant feedback, with a score of 
either 5 or 1?. V/hen the subject had finished scoring the 
last group of 20 cards, the experimenter announced that the 
timer was fixed, but that it was necessary to obtain a time 
for the last score. The subject was then asked to pretend 
that he had not seen the last set of pictures and to repeat 
the last group of 20 cards, while the experimenter timed him. 
This retest on the fifth group of cards was the opportunity 
for the subject to change a performance that was not con­
sonant with his expectations. The dependent variable for 
each subject was the number of response changes made on the
retest.
A 2x2 analysis of variance was performed with ex­
pectancy (high or low) and performance feedback on the fifth 
group of cards (high or low) as factors. A significant perfor 
mance effect (p<.01) was obtained, such that subjects 
given low performance feedback on the fifth group of cards 
made more response changes than subjects given high perfor­
mance feedback. This result was interpreted as evidence for 
the existence of achievement motivation. A significant 
expectancy by performance interaction was obtained (p<.001), 
such that significant "strong" and "weak" differences were 
obtained. The interpretation was that subjects were also 
motivated to reduce dissonance.
Subsequent research has shown that this type of 
expectancy by performance interaction has been difficult to 
obtain. Out of lk published studies using very similar par­
adigms, only four have obtained a significant expectancy by 
performance Interaction indicating differences supportive 
of a dissonance reduction interpretation. Thus, the as­
sertion that individuals will alter performances to match 
expectancies appears to be questionable.
A few experimenters have Investigated the hypothesis 
that the Aronson-Carlsmith results were attributable to 
demand characteristics, as conceptualized and investigated 
by Orne (I962). Demand characteristics are those cues and 
conditions which reveal the nature of the experimental 
hypothesis and/or lead the subject to bias the results in
the direction of that hypothesis.
Ward and Sandvold (1963) suggested that demand 
characteristics may have biased the results in the Aronson- 
Carlsmith experiment. They hypothesized that, since subjects 
were paid and were also told that the test was quite re­
liable and valid, they may have felt obligated to the ex­
perimenter and may have changed their responses on the re­
test, so that their scores on the last group of cards would 
not be dissonant, thus making the test appear to be reliable. 
Thus, the significant '’strong'" and "weak" differences could 
have been obtained because of an obligation felt by the 
subjects, rather than because of an attempt to reduce dis­
sonance. They.did a study with the Aronson-Carlsmith par­
adigm, using'\inpaid subjects and indicating to the subjects 
that the test's reliability and validity were uncertain.
Their analysis of variance produced a significant performance 
effect, but no significant "strong" or "weak" differences. 
These results were interpreted as evidence that the Aronson- 
Carlsmith findings may have been the result of demand char­
acteristics .
There were a few methodological differences between 
the Aronson-Carlsmith and Ward-Sandvold studies, which led 
Silverman and Marcantonio (1965) to perform two experiments, 
attempting to replicate each of the former results. It was 
hypothesized that the inclusion of a reliability-validity 
statement would lead to results favoring a dissonance re­
duction interpretation, while omitting the reliability-
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validity statement would lead to results suggesting the 
existence of achievement motivation only. Their results 
were in the opposite direction.
The interaction effect obtained here suggested 
that subjects in this investigation exhibited success- 
seeking behavior with the reliabllity-validity state-
meht In; the introduction, and “consistency-seeking  ..... '
behavior when this statement was removed! (p. 883)-
In interpreting their results, Silverman and Marcantonio 
hypothesized that the inclusion of the rellability-valid- 
ity statement arroused achievement motivation (since 
failure almost necessarily implied social unperceptiveness) 
to the extent that any relatively weaker dissonance re­
duction motivation did not appreciably affect subjects* 
response changing behavior. Exclusion of the reliabllity- 
validity statement may have resulted in a lower level of 
achievement motivation, since failure less necessarily 
implied social unperceptiveness; perhaps in the relative 
absense of achievement motivation, subjects were more likely 
to change responses in order to reduce dissonance.
The above reasoning implies, however, that Aronson 
and Carlsmith (who included a reliabllity-validity statement) 
should have obtained results supportive of an achievement 
motivation interpretation, while Ward and Sandvold (who told 
subjects that the test had questionable validity) should 
have obtained results favoring a dissonance reduction inter­
pretation. Silverman and Marcantonio explained the actual 
results obtained by these experimenters by alluding to other 
differences in procedure among the three experiments.
11 ....
Since Ward and Sandvold used nursing students who 
were told that the test would be the basis of future class 
discussions, Silverman and Marcantonio argued that these 
subjects may have had achievement motivation aaroused (by
the possibility of discussing_their own scores with c l ass-____
mates) to the extent that any relatively weaker dissonance 
reduction motivation did not appreciably affect subjects' 
response changing behavior. They also suggested that it 
remained possible that, since Aronson and Carlsmith paid 
their subjects, their results could be attributed to demand 
characteristics. Finally,Silverman and Marcantonio hypothesized
j* -
that the achievement motivation arroused by the reliabllity- 
validity statement was probably slight, so that the effect 
of the inclusion or exclusion of this statement was probably 
masked out of the Aronson-Carlsmith results by demand char­
acteristics (since subjects were paid).
The above explanation contained many untested hy­
potheses, so that the results of the Ward-Sandvold and 
Silverman-Marcantonio studies did not conclusively demon­
strate that results which have been obtained in support of 
dissonance.theory were necessarily the result of demand 
characteristics.
Other evidence concerning demand characteristics 
will be briefly mentioned. First, Lowin and Epstein (1965)» 
after unsuccessfully attempting to replicate the Aronson- 
Carlsmith results, tried to replicate those results in an­
other experiment, into which they attempted to build strong
12
demand characteristics (by.having a professor, rather than 
a graduate student, run the experiment, and by paying the 
subjects. ) Again they failed to obtain significant "strong" 
or "weak" differences. Second, Cottrell (1965) found that 
high expectancy-low performance subjects tended to discount 
the importance of test scores to the outcome of the experi­
ment; thus it is not clear whether subjects would try to 
do the experimenter a favor by changing their (unimportant) 
test scores. Finally, it might be noted that Aronson and 
Carlsmith reported that none of their subjects was able to 
guess the experimental hypothesis, and that some subjects 
expressed disbelief that they had changed their responses 
on the retest. Thus, there does not appear to be compelling 
evidence thattdemand characteristics were or were not re­
sponsible for the results of the four studies in which 
significant "strong" and "weak" differences were obtained.
Cottrell's study (I965) provides an example of the 
difficulty involved in manipulating achievement and dis­
sonance reduction motivation. Cottrell used the Aronson- 
Carlsmith paradigm, adding a public-private variable. Sub­
jects in the public group were told that their test scores 
would later be posted in their psychology classroom, while 
subjects in the private group were told that all scores : 
would be kept confidential. It was hypothesized that the 
public group would yield results favoring an achievement 
motivation interpretation, while the results for the private 
group would include differences supportive of a dissonance
13
reduction interpretation. A significant "weak” difference 
(i.e., low expectancy-high performance subjects changed 
more responses than high expectancy-high performance subjects) 
was obtained for both the public and private groups, and 
there were no significant differences between these,tfto 
groups (other than different beliefs about whether scores 
would be posted). Cottrell reports that subjects, on a post- 
experimental questionnaire, tended to rate the test unfavorably. 
Perhaps this unfavorable rating could account for the failure 
of the public-private manipulation to produce differential 
results: subjects probably did not care whether scores were 
posted for a test in which they had little faith.
Other experimenters have contended that the Aronson- 
Carlsmith results may have been an artifact produced by 
differences in, recall of former responses between high and 
low expectancy subjects. Brock et. al. (1965), Lowin and 
Spstein (1965)> and V/aterman and Ford (I965) all found that 
low expectancy subjects’ recall of fifth 20-card group re­
sponses was inferior to high expectancy subjects’ recall.
The following argument utilizes these results in providing 
an alternative .^interpretation of the significant "weak” 
differences that have been obtained.
Assume that high expectancy-low performance subjects 
and low expectancy-low performance subjects are equally 
achievement motivated, i.e., that subjects in each group 
would be equally motivated to change responses on the retest 
in attempting to improve their low-quality performances.
lk
If high expectancy-low performance subjects have better 
recall and are thus better able to identify the former 
responses to be changed, it follows that these subjects will 
be able to make more response changes thanr-the low expectancy 
low performance subjects. Thus, the above ’'weak" difference 
can be attributed to equal achievement motivation between 
the two groups and differential recall between high and low 
expectancy subjects.
Assume that low expectancy-high performance subjects 
and high expectancy-high performance subjects are equally 
achievement motivated, i.e., that sub'jects in each group are 
equally motivated notr.td change responses on the retest in 
attempting, to Retain their high-quality performances. If 
high expectancy-high performance subjects have better recall 
and are thus better able to identify the responses to be 
repeated, it follows that these subjects will be able to 
change fewer responses than the low expectancy-high perfor­
mance subjects. Both "weak" differences could thus be at­
tributed to equal achievement motivation and differential 
recall between high and low expectancy subjects.
No similar argument can be constructed to account 
for the significant "strong" differences (i.e., low ex­
pectancy-high performance response change greater than low 
expectancy-low performance response change) that have been 
obtained, since the experimental evidence suggests that 
there is no difference in recall of responses between these 
two groups. Waterman and Ford, Lowin and Epstein, and Brock
et. al. failed to note that the above arguments are Inap­
plicable to "strong" differences.
The above reasoning was the basis for the choice 
of the labels, "strong" and "weak". The two "weak" differences 
are "weak" evidence_for a dissonance reduction interpretation, 
in that the above differential recall explanation is ap­
plicable. The "strong" difference provides "strong" support 
of a dissonance reduction interpretation, in that no dif­
ferential recall explanation is applicable. The. labels, 
•strong" and "weak", are intended to have no other impli­
cations .
In the four studies which have obtained results con­
sistent with predictions from dissonance theory, a total of 
four significant "weak" differences were obtained, and a 
total of three significant "strong" differences were obtained. 
Thus, the above differential explanation can account for 
approximately half of the evidence suggesting the existence 
of dissonance reduction motivation.
Other considerations would suggest that the ap­
plicability of the differential recall explanation to "weak" 
differences is questionable. One of the studies in question 
(Lowin and Epstein) used recall for the only dependent 
variable. Thus,the recall results of one experiment must be 
applied to the response change results of another experiment. 
In view of the variability of results with this paradigm, 
caution should be used in making such an application. Lowin 
and Epstein's recall results cannot be taken as conclusive
  16
evidence that the ’’weak" differences that have been obtained 
are due to differential recall and achievement motivation.
The other two studies which deal with recall 
(Brock et. al,, in their seventh experiment; Waterman and
Ford) used both recall and response change as dependent___
variables; thus response change data could be adjusted by in­
dividual recall data for each subject. While this procedure 
seemed to be an improvement over that of Lowin and Epstein, 
it is not clear whether the recall measures and response 
change measures that are obtained simultaneously are the 
same as the recall and response change measures that are ob­
tained separately. For example, subjects who feel that changing 
responses is '’cheating’5 may not be as likely to change re­
sponses under.the former condition, since verbalizing both 
recalled former responses and changed retest responses 
simultaneously would seem to constitute an admission of 
"cheating
Brock et. al. (seventh experiment) did not obtain 
significant "strong" or "weak" differences, but found that 
low performance subjects changed more responses than high 
performance subjects, without correcting response change scores 
for recall (The Waterman and Ford study reported no response 
change results, and is excluded from the present discussion.).
In view of the striking difference in response changing be­
havior between subjects in this Brock et. al. study (only a 
significant performance effect) and the studies obtaining 
support for a dissonance reduction interpretation (significant
"strong" or *weak" differences obtained), can the Brock 
et. al. study's recall results be generalized to the sub­
jects in the latter studies? Certainly the generalization 
of a result between such apparently different subject pop- 
ulations could not be considered cautious. Furthermore, it 
is not difficult to argue that.recall results obtained from 
subjects who appear to be achievement motivated (i.e., these 
Brock et. al. subjects) may differ from the recall results 
obtained from subjects who appeared to be dissonance re­
duction motivated. For example, if it is assumed that achieve- 
ment motivated low expectancy subjects’ inferior recall of 
responses is due to repression or suppression of a some­
what painful experience, then it follows that low expectancy 
subjects who are more dissonance reduction motivated may not 
have inferior recall, since the experience would not be as 
painful for these subjects, and there would be less need for 
repression or suppression. Thus the evidence for the dif­
ferential recall explanation is not conclusive, even when 
it is applied to only the "weak" differences.
In summary, it appears that two problems may be 
responsible for the variability of results obtained by ex­
perimenters using the Aronson-Carlsmith paradigm. It appears 
likely that a complex Interaction of achievement motivation 
and dissonance reduction motivation has contributed to the 
variability of experimental results.The frequency of results 
supporting only an achievement motivation interpretation 
suggests that often achievement motivation has been strong
enough to prevent any weaker dissonance reduction motivation 
from noticablyy affecting experimental results. Second, dif­
ferential recall between high and low expectancy subjects 
may have been an artifact producing significant "weak" dif­
ferences (i. e . ..low expectancy-high performance subjects.....
changing more responses than high expectancy-high performance 
subjects, and high expectancy-low performance subjects 
changing more responses than low expectancy-low performance 
subjects). This recall artifact could not affect the like­
lihood of obtaining a significant "strong" difference (i.e., 
^low expectancy-high performance subjects changing more re­
sponses than low expectancy-low performance subjects). It 
was the purpose' of the present study to more fully investigate 
the above two•problems with this series of experiments.
Outline of the Present Study
In an attempt to show that the strength of subjects’ 
achievement motivation can be an important variable affecting 
the likelihood of obtaining results that support dissonance 
theory, the present study used two factors designed to divide 
subjects into groups with varying levels of achievement moti­
vation. Following the reasoning of Silverman and Marcantonio, 
it was hypothesized that a group of subjects hearing a neg­
ative reliabllity-validity statement, which stated that the 
test comprising the experimental task was of questionable 
validity, would be less achievement motivated than subjects 
hearing a positive reliability-validity statement, which 
stated that the test was highly valid.
________ ;...     -_____  ,.......   - -.19
Subjects were further divided into high and low 
achievement groups on the basis of PRF scores. While the 
PRF achievement scale was originally intended for this purpose, 
preliminary data (on.54 subjects) indicated that this scale 
did not_ differentiate subjects,,who_ apparently .attempted, to--- ...
improve their performances (high achievers) from low achieve­
ment subjects. PRF affiliation scale scores were then used 
to differentiate between high and low achievement subjects.
The following reasoning was used to justify this departure 
from the originally intended procedure. It was assumed (page §) 
that "subjects with a high need for social achievement
»*
(as measured by the PRF) would exhibit a greater tendency to 
achieve" on the* experimental task. According to Murray, 
the need for social achievement is a fusion of the need to 
achieve and the need for affiliation. This means that be­
havior satisfying the need for social achievement sim­
ultaneously satisfies both the need to achieve and the need 
for affiliation, i.e., the need."To form friendships and 
associations. To greet, join, and live with others. To 
cooperate and converse sociably with others, to love. To 
join groups." (Murray, 1938; p. 7^3)* Since social achieve­
ment is a combination of the need to achieve and affiliate, 
it follows that high social achievers (i.e., high achievers 
on the experimental task) might be Identified on the basis 
of PRF achievement scale scores, affiliation scale scores, 
or some combination of these scores. Results which support 
the use of the PRF affiliation scale for differentiating
-        :  -    .    -20 -
"between high and low achievers are reported with the results 
of other pilot work in the Appendix.
It was expected that the reliabllity-validity state­
ment and achievement factors would result in groups of
 subjects wilh__varying_.levels .of ..achievement motivation. ..It___
was hypothesized that some subject groups (especially low 
achievement subjects under the negative reliabllity-validity 
statement condition) would be sufficiently low In achieve­
ment motivation so. that their behavior would be_ notlcably .
affected by dissonance reduction motivation. Specifically,
„ hypothesis number one stated that results supportive of a. 
dissonance reduction interpretation would be obtained from 
the group hearing the negative reliabllity-validity 
statement, while the group hearing the positive reliabllity- 
validity statement would yield results supporting an achieve­
ment motivation interpretation only. Hypothesis two stated 
that results supporting a dissonance reduction interpretation 
would be obtained only from low achievement subjects under 
the negative reliabllity-validity statement condition 
(Both of these hypotheses are stated as alternative, rather 
than null, hypotheses.).
Both response recall and response change measures 
were obtained in the present study. Evidence was obtained 
suggesting that the response change measure was minimally 
affected by the process of obtaining the response recall 
measure. It was expected that the recall findings of 
other experiments would be replicated for subjects appearing
- 21
to be achievement motivated, but not for subjects who appeared 
to be dissonance reduction motivated. Hypothesis three 
(alternative form) stated that there would be no differences 
in recall of responses between high and low expectancy groups 
-from-which -results supporting-a dissonance reduction inter­
pretation were obtained. Hypothesis four (alternative form) 
stated that, among subject groups from which results sup­
porting an achievement motivation interpretation were ob­
tained, high expectancy subjects’ recall of responses would 
be superior to low expectancy subjects’ recall.
Chapter II
MiSTHOD
Subjects' ; ....................... ...
One hundred thirty-two subjects from University 
of Montana introductory psychology classes were used. Ap­
proximately 60$ of the subjects were males. Participation 
in experimentation was a course requirement, and subjects ‘ 
were free to choose the experiments that they participated 
-in. Four of these subjects were eliminated from the experi­
ment, two of them because they indicated very strong dis­
belief. in. the experimenter.*s. statements, .and' the: other, two 
because of procedural errors made by the experimenter P. An 
additional 21 subjects were used during pilot experimentation.
Procedure
While the general Aronson-Carlsmith paradigm was 
used, the specific procedures used in this experiment 
represent a modification of their procedures in several re­
spects. These modifications were considered necessary after 
pilot work, a full report of which appears in the Appendix.
The experimenter checked on the subjects' prior 
knowledge of the experiment and said that he was developing 
a new interview technique and wished to relate the findings
2£
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of the interview to findings from a series of short per- . 
sonality tests. The first task was filling out a short form 
of the Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1967) in a 
group. Affiliation scale scores obtained from PRF were
used to differentiate high, .achieverŝ _(.i*e.. , those subjects----
who would be expected to attempt to improve their scores) 
from low achievers. An affiliation score of 16 or more re­
sulted in a high achievement designation, while scores of 
.15 or less were considered to be low. achievement scores.
The experimental task was introduced as a Social 
^Sensitivity Scale. The subjects were told that the scale 
was a measure of how well they "understand others, and that, 
while one does 'not normally make judgements based on such 
limited information, the theory is that your ability to 
judge in such a limited situation should be an indicator of 
your ability to understand others in normal situations."
At this point half of the subjects heard the following pos­
itive reliability-validity statement, which is similar to 
the one used by Aronson and Carlsmith.
This test has been widely used by psychologists with 
good success for several years. It is. a very good measure 
of how sensitive an individual is to other people, i.e., 
subjects who score high on this test generally, when 
interviewed, express a good deal of understanding and 
insight into other people. Subjects who score low on ; 
the test, on the other hand, tend to express a somewhat 
superficial understanding of other people when interviewed.
The remaining subjects heard the following negative reli­
ability-valid ity statement.
In practice. though, it...well, it is in .a very- 
early stage of development; it. has not been completely 
standardized, so that it is not yet known how ac­
curately the test measures,social sensitivity. There 
seems to be some indication that in some persons it 
measures social sensitivity fairly accurately, while 
for some others its measure doesn't seem to be a good 
index of their social sensitivity.
One- hundred cards' were ‘used'TrTthe experY-
mental task. Each card had pictures of three faces on it.
The cards were prepared by pasting old college annual photo­
graphs on sheets of paper, photostating these sheets of paper 
and pasting the photocopies onto 3Mx5" index cards. These 
cards were presented individually to subjects through a hole 
■ in a 2'x3* screen, which was placed between the experimenter 
and the subject.
Subjects were instructed to pick out the person on 
the card whbolateroasked for psychological help and respond 
"left", "right", or "middle" to the experimenter, who re­
corded the responses. The experimenter noted that "the test 
is quite difficult, so that people hardly ever score above 
60$, and, for that matter, it's unusual to score below 30$, 
which is a chance level."
Under the po sitiv_e reliablllty-valldity statement, 
condition, the experimenter reiterated that "individuals 
whose scores are high are usually quite sensitive to the 
feelings of others, while those scoring low tend to be 
socially insensitive." Finally, all subjects were;,told 
that "it is difficult to judge performance on the test, 
that some Individuals who feel that they are doing poorly
obtain high scores, and the reverse is often true." Cards 
were then shown, through the opening in the 2'x3' screen.
Feedback was given after each 20-card group, after . 
the experimenter pretended to score the responses for that 
group. Half of the subjects received feedback scores of 12, 
11, 11, and 12 on each of the first four 20-card groups 
respectively (high expectancy condition), while the remaining 
subjects received feedback scores of ?, 6, 6, and 7 on the 
first four 20-card groups respectively (low expectancy con­
dition) .
After the fifth 20-card group the experimenter 
feigned dismay due to his alleged failure to start his stop- 
watched. The experimenter asked the subject to score his 
own answer sheet, while the experimenter left the room in 
.order to obtain advice about rectifying his error. Half of 
each expectancy group obtained scores of 12 (high perfor­
mance condition), while the remaining subjects obtained a 
score of 7 (low performance condition). Appropriate answer’ 
keys were prepared for each subject during the testing on 
the fifth 20-card group.
After the subject finished scoring the last group 
the experimenter reappeared and announced that he had been 
advised to have the subject repeat the last 20 cards, pre­
tending that he had never seen them before. The retest on 
the last group of 20 cards began after a short waiting per­
iod ("so that your memory of the faces will not be fresh, 
and it will be more like the first time you looked at the
cards") that increased the time elapsing since the dis­
covery of the "error" to about six minutes. After the sub­
ject had completed half of the cards, however, the exper­
imenter halted him. The number of changes that the subject 
had made up to this point was one of the dependent variables, 
the 10-card change score.
At this point, the experimenter announced, '’He also 
told me to obtain an estimate of how well you can remember 
your original responses, in order to see if your memory 
is affecting your present performance. So I'm going to keep 
my stopwatch off for now and I want you to pick out your 
first responses on the rest of the cards. Then after we're 
done with this,- I'll start the watch and we can finish what 
we've started, but for right now I want you to try to pick 
out your first responses." Then subjects attempted to choose 
their original responses on the 10 remaining cards. The order 
of the cards on the retest was such that half of the sub­
jects attempted recall on the first ten cards, and the re­
maining subjects attempted recall on the last ten. cards.
The number of changes made in attempting to choose the or­
iginal responses was the memory change score.
After attempting recall on 10 cards, subjects were 
then asked to "do what we had been doing, i.e., take the 
test as though you'd never seen the cards before", for the 
ten cards which were used for testing recall.
In summary, a four-way factorial design was employed 
with two levels of each of the following factors: expectancy
(high and low), performance (high and low), achievement 
(high and low;affiliation scores), and statement condition
' J(positive and negative). There were five primary dependent 
variables which were analyzed using 2x2x2x2 analyses of 
variance. These dependent variables were 10-card change 
scores, memory change scores, 20-card change scores (i.e., 
the number of response changes made for all 20 cards under 
the Instructions to "pretend you've never seen the cards 
before";), memory corrected change scores (i.e., 20-card 
change scores minus twice the memory change score), and 
change from memory scores (i.e., the number of responses 
made under the "pretend" instructions which differed from 
responses made -under recall instructions).
Subjects were given two post-test questionnaires 
(See Appendix). One questionnaire was intended to measure 
subjects' belief in the experimenter's statements. The pur­
pose of the other questionnaire was primarily to measure 
the effects of experimental manipiilations. A more thorough 
description of these questlonn&irso appears in Chapter III.
Chapter III
RESULTS
-— —̂ :----Results'obtained for the various'change'scores are"
reported first, followed by results obtained for question- 
airre measures. Data summaries and summaries of analyses 
of variance are presented in the Appendix. Except where 
noted, cell variances in analyses were found to be homo­
geneous. Calculations for analyses of variance utilized 
-methods contained in Winer (1962), and, except where noted, 
reported significant differences were obtained with a priori 
tests. *
A matched tfctest (Hays,-, 1963> p* 335) was used to 
test for differences between change scores obtained on 
the first ten cards and change scores obtained on the last 
ten cards. Atvalheeof f-1.31 was obtained, s,b that the mean 
difference between change scores obtained on the first ten 
cards and change scores obtained on the last ten cards was 
-2.66. Since t.g 127= “1*288 (two-tailed), it was concluded 
that any difference between the two sets of scores was un­
important, and that the recall measuring procedure minimally 
affected the response changing process. Thus it appeared to 
be reasonable to analyze data involving the sum of the above
28
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scores.
The only significant main effect in the memory cor­
rected change score (i.e., 20-card change score minus two 
times the memory change score) was a performance effect;
(See Tabl_e_5,^Appendix..),.__Low_ performance, subjects changed .... 
an average of 2.50 responses, significantly more than the 
high performance subjects* average response change of 1.14 
(p<.025). Thus, subjects under all low performance con­
ditions apparently attempted to improve their performances.
Table 2 provides some justification for the use of 
PRF affiliation scores to differentiate between high and low 
achievers on the experimental task. High achievement sub­
jects changed - significantly more responses under the low 
performance condition (p<.025). No other Table 2 differences 
were significant, so that low achievement subjects apparent­
ly did not attempt to improve their performances under the
Table 2
A Performance by Achievement Summary Table with 
Mean Memory Corrected Change Scores
Performance
Achievement
High Low
High 0.53 2.75
Low 1.75 2.37
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low performance condition, since these subjects did not 
change significantly more responses than low achievement- 
high performance subjects. Thus, the high or low achieve­
ment designation was related to subjects * response changing 
behavior in the expected manner.
No significant "strong or "weak" differences were 
obtained in the above analysis. However, for low achieve­
ment subjects under the negative reliability-validity state­
ment condition, nonsignificant "strong" and "weak" dif­
ferences were noted. These differences could not, of course, 
be interpreted as evidence for a dissonance theory inter­
pretation.
A number of significant differences were obtained 
in the change.from memory score (i.e., the number of re­
sponses made under the "pretend" instructions which dif­
fered from responses made under recall instructions) an­
alysis (See Table 6 in the Appendix.). Again, a significant 
performance effect was obtained, with mean low performance 
response change (3-58) exceeding mean high performance re­
sponse change (2.65* p'c.Ol). This result was further ev­
idence that subjects under low performance conditions ap- 
parently attempted to improve their performances.
- High achievement subjects made an average of 3.^8 
response changes, significantly more (p<.025, a posteriori 
test) than low achievement subjects* mean response change 
of 2.65* Table 3 shows that this difference was obtained 
primarily because high achievement subjects* mean response
change exceeded low achievement subjects' response change 
(p <.05, a posteriori test) under the positive reliability- 
validity statement condition. No analogous significant 
difference was obtained under the negative reliability-
valid ity statement condition, and there were no other slg-___
nificant differences fa posteriori) within Table 3* A pos­
sible interpretation of Table 3 results was that the pos­
itive reliability-validity statement condition produced a 
relatively increased differential in achievement moti­
vation between high and low achievement subjects, such 
that high achievement subjects apparently attempted to 
change responses to a greater extent than low achievement 
subjects under-both performance conditions. While other 
interpretations may be applicable, the above interpretation 
is consistent with the interpretations of results that follow
Table 3
An Achievement by Beliability-validity Statement Summary 
Table with Mean Change from Memory Scores
Reliability -validity
Achievement statement
Negative Fositve
High 3.22 3*7^
Low 3-19 2.10
Table A presents results similar to those presented
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in Table 2. High achievement subjects changed signifIcantly 
more responses under the low performance condition than 
under the high performance condition (p < . 025)• Wo an­
alogous difference was obtained for low achievement sub- v 
jects. Table k significant differences were interpretated 
as further evidence that the PRF affiliation scale dif­
ferentiates high achievers from low achievers on the ex­
perimental task.
Table 4 ... - —
A Performance by Achievement Summary Table with 
Mean Change from Memory Scores
Performance
Achievement■ ■ ‘ -
High Low
High 2,88 3.92
Low 2.25 3.11
No significant "strong" or "weak" differences were 
obtained in the preceding analysis. For low achievement 
subjects under the negative reliability-validity statement 
condition, nonsignificant "strong" and "weak" differences 
were noted. The significance level for all three of these 
differences was very close to the .10 level. These differences 
were considered to constitute weak, but inconclusive evi­
dence for a dissonance theory interpretation.
The results of the memory change score analysis (See
Table 7, Appendix. ) were similar to the results of previous 
experiments. Low expectancy subjects' mean response change 
of 3*33 exceeded high expectancy subjects' mean response 
change of 2.61 (p<.025). No other significant differences
__were .obtained.. Low expectancy . subjects ' ..recall of their ___...
former responses was slightly inferior to high expectancy 
subjects' recall.
Only a significant expectancy effect was.obtained 
in the 10-card change score analysis of variance (See Table 
8, Appendix.). Low expectancy subjects changed significantly 
.more responses (4.1*0 than high expectancy subjects (3*37* 
p<.025). No other significant differences were obtained, 
although the difference between low and high performance 
subjects nearly attained significance at the .05 level. Re­
calling that the mean memory corrected response change was 
1.85* and that the mean change from memory score was 3*12, 
it was concluded that subjects tended to repeat their former 
responses on the retest. If subjects tended to repeat their 
former responses on the retest, then their ability to recall 
these former responses should have been expected to affect 
their 10- and 20-card change scores (which were not corrected, 
for recall). Since high expectancy subjects' recall of 
their former responses was superior to low expectancy sub­
jects' recall, it could have been expected that high ex­
pectancy subjects' 10- and 20-card change scores would in­
dicate less response change than low expectancy subjects'
10- and 20-card change scores, since high expectancy subjects
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would make fewer recall errors in their tendency to repeat 
their former responses. Thus,-the above significant expectantly 
effect in the 10-card analysis of variance was consistent 
with the results of other analyses.
 ______In .the..20-card change score analysis of variance
(See Table 9, Appendix.) both a significant expectancy ef­
fect and a significant performance effect were obtained. Low 
expectancy subjects’ mean response change of 8.5^ exceeded 
high expectancy subjects’ mean response change of 7.08 
(p<.01). Low performance subjects* mean response change of 
 ̂8.55 exceeded high performance subjects’ mean response change 
of ?.03 (pc.01). The significant expectancy effect was con­
sistent with the results of the 10-card analysis, while the 
significant performance effect was consistent with the re­
sults of other analyses.
The results for the data obtained with the first 
questionairre will be reported next. These data consisted of 
responses on a 9-point ordinal scale, and the analysis of 
variance requires ratio measurement. Nevertheless, analyses 
of variance were used, in order to investigate possible 
higher order interactions. Since the measurement requirements 
for the analysis of variance were not met, results were in­
terpreted conservatively.
The item, "Circle the score that you feel you would 
obtain on another 20 cards of the Social Sensitivity Scale" 
was an attempt to test the effect of the expectancy man­
ipulation. A four factor analysis of variance w&s .used (See
Table 10, Appendix.)* An F of 117 * 3» significant well be­
yond the .0005 level, was obtained for the result that high 
expectancy subjects expected a-higher score (11.3) than 
low expectancy subjects (7*3 )*
Cell variances were found to be heterogeneous in 
the preceding analysis (See Table .10, Appendix.). While 
the preceding result could not be disputed because of 
heterogenity of variance, another slightly significant re­
sult was considered to be uninterpretable, and was excluded
from discussion. •—  ------ — • —--  ---■ J — ;---
In conclusion, the above results indicated that the 
expectancy manipulation was successful in producing dif­
ferential expectancies. Since the item on 'the'questionairre ...
referred to -'another 20 cards*’ of the test, it appeared .
that the differential expectancies were not significantly ..changed
by dissonant performance feedback.
The item, "How important was it for you to do well 
on the Social Sensitivity Scale?" was an attempt to determine 
whether the reliability-validity statement manipulation and 
the achievement variable (as measured by affiliation scores) 
were associated with differential achievement motivation. A 
two factor analysis of variance, with reliability-validity 
statement and achievement as factors, was used (See Table 
11, Appendix.). Subjects hearing the positive reliability- 
validity statement indicated greater importance (mean=3.76, 
where a low score indicated importance) than did subjects 
hearing the negative reliability-validity statement (mean=
k.77i P -005). High achievement subjects indicated great­
er importance (mean-••=3. 06) than did low achievement subjects 
(mean=4.69; p<.01). These results suggested that the pos­
itive reliability-validity statement and high PRF affili- 
 ation scale scores were both associated with higher^achieve­
ment motivation.
Another intended measure of achievement motivation 
was the item, "Circle the score that'you would like to ob­
tain on another 20 cards of the Social Sensitivity Scale." 
Again, an achievement by reliability-validity statement 
“analysis of variance was used (See Table 12, Appendix.).
A significant (p<.005) achievement effect was obtained, such 
that high achievement subjects indicated a preference for 
a higher score (15*7 ) than did low achievement subjects 
(I3.5 ). No other significant difference was obtained. These 
results provided further evidence that scoring high on the 
PRF affiliation scale was associated with higher achievement 
motivation.
It was not clear why subjects hearing the positive 
reliability-validity statement appeared to be associated 
with high achievement motivation on the "how important" 
item but not on the "score you would like" item. Since the 
reliability-validity statement manipulation produced few. 
effects in the response change analyses, a possible in­
terpretation is that the primary effect of that manipulation 
was merely to elicit verbal indications that the test score 
was important to the subject. However, since high achievement
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subjects verbally indicated high achievement motivation 
oh both items and also behaviorally indicated high achieve­
ment motivation (Referlto Table 2 and Table 4 results. ), it was 
concluded that PRF affiliation scale scores were more strong­
ly associated with achievement motivation than was the 
reliability-validity statement manipulation.
Chapanis and Ghapanis (1964) have criticized cog­
nitive dissonance studies for not obtaining several lines 
of convergent evidence indicating cognitive dissonance to 
be the actual intervening variable linking independent var­
iables with dependent variables. Since subjects experiencing 
dissonance reduction motivation should be expected to also 
experience discomfort (Festinger, 1957» P*3)» the item,
"Did you find, the SociaLlSensitivity Scale enjoyable?” was 
included to provide a measure of that discomfort, and thus 
provide additional data on the applicability of a dis­
sonance reduction interpretation. The data obtained on 
this item was analyzed in a four factor analysis of variance 
(See Table 13, Appendix.). The only significant result 
(p < . 05) was that low expectancy-low performance subjects 
indicated less enjoyment (mean=5*25, where a low score in­
dicated enjoyment) than either high expectancy-low perfor­
mance subjects (mean=4.28) or low expectancy -high perfor­
mance subjects (mean=4.16). This result suggested that dis­
comfort experienced during the test was greatest when the 
feedback received by subjects was consistently negative.
Since the prediction from dissonance theory that subjects
under the dissonant experimental conditions would experience 
greater discomfort was not confirmed, the results for this
i ;
item were not supportive of dissonance theory. •; ;
The discomfort predicted by dissonance theory could
 conceivably lead to a negative attitude-toward-the--tes-t,—  _--
since the test might be considered by subjects to be the j 
source of that discomfort. Also, subjects might avoid the ; 
discomfort associated with a dissonant state by devaluing the 
test, i.e., dissonant test performances might not lead to ' 
discomfort if the test was considered to be a poor one.
^In order to provide further data on the applicability of 
any dissonance reduction interpretation, the item, "Do you 
feel that theSocial Sensitivity Scale is a good test?*, 
was included.‘It was hypothesized that subjects experiencing 
dissonance might answer this item more negatively than sub-
4 )jects not experiencing dissonance.
. The data for the above item was analyzed using a 
four factor analysis of variance (See Table 14, Appendix.). 
Subjects hearing the positive reliability-validity state­
ment indicated a higher opinion of the test (mean=4.91» 
where a low score indicated a high opinion of the test) than 
did subjects hearing the negative reliability-validity state-
« t
ment (mean=5.69; p<.05). High achievement subjects in-
- >
dicated a higher opinion of the test (mean^4.79) than did 
low achievement subjects (mean=5«b0, pc.OT). The former 
result was viewed as a weak result which was the consequence 
of subjects accepting the content of the reliability-validity
. . ■ i : _____________ _____________________________________________ -  — 5 9 - — ■_________
statements. A possible interpretation of the latter result 
was that the test, which supposedly measured social per­
ceptiveness (an attribute which presumably must have been 
highly valued by subjects obtaining high PRF affiliation
scores) was considered to be a •'good'' test by the high ach-______
ievement subjects (in that it measured an attribute that 
they valued highly). Similarly, low achievement subjects 
probably did not value social perceptiveness as much, and 
did not consider the test to be as_"good", since it measured 
an attribute that they did not value highly.
The dissonance theory prediction that subjects under 
the dissonant experimental conditions would value the test 
less highly was not confirmed. Thus, the results for the 
above item did not support dissonance theory.
If achievement motivated subjects believed themselves 
to be superior on the test, then their attempt to obtain 
a better score could have been viewed as an attempt to re­
duce the dissonance between that belief in their superiority 
and the "fact" that their original performance score was low.
The item, "Do you feel that you are good at taking the Social 
Sensitivity Scale?" investigated whether subjects appearing 
to be achievement motivated were, in attempting to obtain 
a superior score, reducing dissonance in the above manner.
A four factor analysis of variance was used on the 
data obtained on the above item (See Table 15» Appendlx.). 
Subjects hearing the. positive reliability-validity state­
ment indicated believing themselves to be better (mean=5.73,
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where a low score indicated a high self appraisal) than 
subjects hearing the negative reliability-validity state­
ment (mean=6.25; p<.05). Due to the ordinal measure and 
the low significance, this result was considered to be in­
conclusive. Since only weak evidence indicated that the sub­
jects hearing the positive reliability-validity statement 
were highly achievement motivated {Recall that these sub­
jects gave only verbal, but not behavioral indication of 
strong achievement-motivation.), the above weak result was 
not considered to be evidence that subjects with strong 
achievement motivation were reducing dissonance between a 
low score and a belief that their ability was superior.
Therefore, there was no evidence that achievement moti- 
*vated behavior on this experimental task could be viewed as 
dissonance reduction.
A difference was obtained between high expectancy 
subjects (6.98) and low expectancy subjects (5*00) on the 
■ above item. An 5“ of 93*27 was obtained, significant far 
beyond the .0005 level. This difference was another indi­
cation that the expectancy manipulation was successful in 
producing differential expectancies, which were not changed 
by dissonant performance feedback.
The item, "When you were taking the test over and 
pretending that you had never seen the cards before, about 
how many answers do you think that you may.v have changed?" 
was an attempt to provide some indication of subjects’ 
awareness of response change. Only 113 subjects were asked
 4i;
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this question. These subjects' estimates (mean=h-.8?) were'
i
lower than their 20-card change scores (mean=7.?0). The 
product-moment correlation between these estimates and the 
20-card change scores was .387* significant beyond the .0005 
level. Since subjects_were able to estimate their own re- ____
sponse changes to some degree, it appeared that subjects
had some awareness of their response changes. , ’
The following item was included toward the end of
the experiment. . ,
Think back to the time when you were taking the 
test over, pretending that you had never seen the cards 
before. At that time, did any thought similar to this 
occur to you: that you should try to obtain a score 
that is consistent with the scores that you had been ; 
getting all along on the test? If so, did you want to -
be consistent for yourself, or so that.my experiment
would ge.t consistent results*-? At i theotime when you 
were pretending that you had never seen the cards be­
fore, did any thought similar to this occur to you: that 
you should try to get a better score on the test?
Thirty-four subjects indicated achievement motivation on 
this item, while 20 subjects indicated dissonance reduction 
motivation (i.e., being consistent for themselves). Memory 
corrected change score data and change from memory score 
data for these subjects was inspected visually. Response 
change patterns suggested achievement motivation, regardless 
of whether achievement or dissonance reduction motivation 
was indicated on the above item. This visual inspection
provided only slight behavioral indication of dissonance re­
duction motivation among subjects verbally indicating dis-: 
sonance reduction motivation, i.e., out of six possible 
’’strong" or "weak" differences inspected, only one of these
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differences was in the direction supporting a dissonance 
reduction interpretation. The results on this item suggested 
that there was minimal correspondence "between verbally in­
dicated motivation and motivation as suggested by patterns
_ of response change.  ___;__.v   _  .......... . ...... .....
The following item was included to check whether sub­
jects suspected deception in the scores that they received 
on the fifth group of cards: "On the last group of cards
you received a __. Was there any reason to question that
score at that time?" On this item, all subjects included 
in the experiment indicated belief in the performance score 
that they had obtained.
The remaining questionairre items (See items 1-7 
*
on Questionairre 2 in the Appendix.) represented an attempt 
to measure the strength of belief in the experimenter's 
statements. These items were a series of increasingly spec­
ific questions about subjects beliefs and suspicions about 
the nature of the experiment. Subjects were eliminated from 
the experiment on the basis of these items only if the 
experimenter felt that their responses indicated strong dis­
belief in the experimenter's statements. Two subjects were 
eliminated in this way. One subject indicated suspicion 
from the beginning of the second 20-card group, and was 
"pretty sure" that deception was involved by the end of the 
experiment, especially during the retest procedure. The 
other subject indicated suspicion during the retest pro­
cedure, and realized that the pictures were photostated.
Chapter IV
DISCUSSION
--------- As-noted earlier*-attempting to improve a perfor- -
manoe on the experimental task was regarded as social 
achievement, as defined by Murray (1938). Social achieve­
ment, according to Murray, satisfies both achievement and 
affiliation needs. Assuming that the PRF achievement and 
affiliation scales measure these needs, respectively, then 
* it appears that either of these scales could be used to dif­
ferentiate high achievers on the experimental task (i.e., 
those subjects who attempt.to improve their performances)9
from low achievers (i.e., those subjects who do not attempt 
to improve their performances). The change score results 
strongly suggested that the PRF affiliation scale was super­
ior to the PRF achievement scale in differentiating high 
achievers from low achievers. Verbal reports of achievement 
motivation by subjects also suggested that the PRF af­
filiation scale successfully differentiated between high 
achievers and low achievers.
The experimental manipulations all appeared to 
have their predicted effects. The expectancy manipulation 
appeared to successfully produce differential expectancies
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(as indicated by the questionnaire results) and subjects 
indicated belief in the legitimacy of performance feedback 
scores on one questionnaire item. While there was only weak 
evidence that the reliability-validity statement manipu­
lation produced differential achievement motivation (i.e., 
response change data did not indicate differential achieve­
ment motivation, while results from one out of two question­
naire items suggested differential achievement motivation), 
there was strong indication (i.e., from both questionnaire 
data and response change data) that PRF affiliation scores 
differentiated high achievers from low achievers. In sum- 
mary, consonant and dissonant conditions were apparently 
experienced by-subjects having little apparent achievement 
motivation and by subjects having relatively high achieve­
ment motivation. let, in the response change analyses, only 
results supportive of an achievement motivation interpretation 
were obtained; there were no significant results (i.e . ,
"weak1'„,or "strong" differences) supportive of a dissonance 
reduction interpretation. Hypotheses one and two (which 
predicted results supportive of dissonance theory) were 
rejected, and hypothesis three (predicting a difference in 
recall between high and low expectancy subjects who appeared 
to be achievement motivated) was accepted. Since hypothesis 
four (predicting no difference in recalllbetWeemuhigfthand,'; 
low expectancy subjects who appeared to be dissonance re­
duction motivated) presupposed that results supportive of a 
dissonance reduction Interpretation would be obtained, this
^5
hypothesis was untestable.
Results obtained on two questionnaire items also 
failed to support any dissonance theory interpretation.
Subjects did not, as predicted by dissonance theory, in-
 dicate more-discomfort under dissonant conditions than u n d e r —
consonant conditions. Subjects under dissonant conditions 
failed to act in accordance with dissonance theory by lowering 
their opinion of the test. While some subjects verbally in­
dicated a need to be consistent on the test, there was little 
Indication that this need affected their response changing 
* behavior. In view of the present study's attempt to obtain 
optimal conditions for producing results favoring a dissonance 
reduction motivation interpretation (by Including subjects with 
minimal achievement motivation), these results and the results 
of theiresponseecha^ge;analyses suggested that dissonance 
reduction motivation was either nonexistent or negligible 
in the present study.
An advocate of dissonance theory might argue that 
less discomfort due to dissonance was elicited in subjects 
in the present experiment than in previous experiments, 
since in the present study the difference between dissonant 
scores was only 5i while in previous studies the difference 
between dissonant scores was 12. The present study's lack 
of evidence for a dissonance reduction interpretation could 
be attributed to this smaller difference between high and low 
scores, i.e., perhaps the discomfort due to dissonance was 
insufficient to motivate subjects to reduce dissonance.
A smaller difference between high and low scores appeared 
to be unavoidable, since during pilot experimentation a 
majority of subjects indicated strong disbelief in a dif­
ference of 12 between dissonant scores. Thus, a dissonance 
theorist might argue that the above conclusion that dis­
sonance reduction was nonexistent or negligible holds only 
for the present study, and not for previous studies.
Two comments can be made in reply to the above 
argument. First, since subjects were told that scores of 
60% and 30$ were high and low scores, a difference of 5 ’
between scores (i.e., between 60$ and 30$) should have been 
considered to be dissonant by subjects. According to dis­
sonance theory,, then, some discomfort should have been ex- 
perienced, resulting in some dissonance-reducing behavior. 
Since the present study found no evidence for dissonance-- 
reducing behavior, the present study's results may still be 
viewed as contradictory to the predictions of dissonance 
•theory. Therefore, a dissonance reduction interpretation of 
the '‘strong” and "weak" differences obtained in previous 
studies should be considered to be more tenuous, in view of 
the present study’s results. Second, arguing that a difference 
of 12 is necessary to produce "strong" and "weak" differences 
exemplifies a major difficulty with dissonance theory: since 
the conditions which should produce dissonance (and dis­
sonance-reducing behavior.) have not been explicitly stated 
(e.g., how large should the difference between high and low 
scores be?) it is difficult to obtain precise predictions
from the theory, so that any clear empirical evaluation of 
the theory becomes difficult.
Preliminary results (See Appendix. ) indicated that 
response change was most likely to occur whenever subjects
-could not recall their previous responses^ Also the mean----
memory corrected change score (1.85) a*id the mean change 
from memory score .(3*12) were low in magnitude compared 
with the mean memory change score of 6*95 (The latter mean 
has been doubled, since memory change scores were obtained 
using only ten cards, while the former two means were based 
*on measures with 20 cards.). These results indicated that, 
a relatively large proportion of the variance in subjects’ 
response change could be attributed to incorrect recall, i.e., 
during the retest, subjects were primarily repeating what they 
thought was their original performance. Thus, any of the 
significant effects obtained in the response change analyses 
were viewed as reflecting relatively weak response tend­
encies. Specifically, while change score results strongly 
suggested that subjects were achievement motivated, the 
response tendency suggesting achievement motivation was rel­
atively weak, so that the achievement motivation of subjects 
was considered to be modest. The weakness of the response 
tendency suggesting achievement motivation was attributed to 
both the relatively small number of response changes needed 
to change a low score of 7 to a high score of 12, as well as 
the frequently observed apathy of subjects.
The results of the present study replicated the find-
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ings of previous studies that low expectancy subjects' re­
call of their original responses for the last group of 
Cards was inferior .to high expectancy subjects' recall.
Thus, as was indicated previously, the "weak" differences 
supportive of a dissonance reduction interpretation (i.e., 
low expectancy-high performance subjects changing more 
responses than high expectancy-high performance subjects, 
and high expectancy-low performance subjects changing more 
responses than low expectancy-low performance subjects) 
that have been obtained in previous experiments could 
be attributed to achievement motivation and the inferior 
recall of low expectancy subjects. The similarity of recall
results between the present study and others (i.e., Lowin 
*
and Epstein, Waterman and Ford, Brock er. al.), together 
with the consistency of findings supportive of an achievement 
interpretation, suggests that achievement motivation and 
inferior recall among low expectancy subjects were likely 
to have been an influence involved in producing the signif­
icant "weak" differences that have been obtained by other 
experimenters.
It is not clear why achievement motivation and the 
Inferior recall of low expectancy subjects in the present 
study did not produce significant "weak" differences in 
the analysis of data that was not corrected for recall. One 
possible explanation was that achievement motivation In the 
present study was so. modest that its Interaction with low 
expectancy subjects' inferior recall did not produce these
2l9
differences. 'This explanation was considered to be tenuous.
A demand' characteristics interpretation remains 
applicable to both the significant ‘'weak1' and ''strong” 
differences that have been obtained in this series of 
■ experiments. That is, some subjects in each experiment may - 
have concluded that they should seek to be consistent in 
their scoring.
In summary, three interpretations can be applied 
to the significant "weak" differences obtained in this ser­
ies of experiments. Demand characteristics, dissonance 
-reduction motivation, or achievement motivation and the 
inferior recall of low expectancy subjects may have resulted 
in those "weak” differences. The evidence'accumulated has 
been insufficient to indicate or rule out any of the above 
interpretations, so that any or all of these variables may 
have caused these differences. The dissonance reduction 
interpretation now appears to be more tenuous, in-view of the 
present study’s failure to obtain evidence for dissonance re­
duction by low achievement subjects.
While the difference in recall between high and low 
expectancy subjects apparently cannot produce significant 
"strong" differences, it will now be argued that the imper­
fect recall of low expectancy subjects could bias results 
in the direction of obtaining a "strong" difference (It 
should be emphasized that the present discussion is con­
cerned with Imperfect recall, and not the difference in 
recall between low and high expectancy subjects.). Consider
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low expectancy subjects tested with the Aronson-Carlsmith 
procedure. An achievement motivated low expectancy-high 
performance subject with perfect recall would optimally 
change no more than three responses (since he was told that 
he had 17 correct responses out of 20). An achievement moti­
vated low expectancy-low performance subject would optimally 
change no more than 15 responses (since he was told that he 
had five correct responses). Now assume that, as in the 
present study, these low expectancy subjects are unable to 
recall about a third of their former responses. A low 
expectancy-high performance subject attempting to change
.A
three responses would also be expected to change about six 
responses due-to imperfect recall. Thus a low expectancy- 
high performance subject might optimally change a total of 
nine responses, three of them intentionally, and six of them 
due to incorrect recall. A low expectancy-low performance 
subject would be unable to correctly recall about five of the 
15 responses that he would optimally attempt to change, 
i.e., he would incorrectly remember having chosen a face 
that he had not chosen on five, of these 15 cards. The 
subject's attempt to change his response on those five cards 
would involve a choice between a face that he had origin­
ally chosen, and one that he had not chosen. Assuming that 
each of these two faces were equally likely to be chosen, 
the subject would be expected to repeat his original response 
about 2.5 times on those five cards (Perhaps he could be 
expected to repeat his original response more often, if the
faces originally chosen had some qualities that made them 
more likely to be chosen than the other face.). Thus, a low 
expectancy-low performance subject with imperfect recall 
would be expected to change no more than 12.5 responses (i.e., 
15 intended response changes minus' 2.5 mistakenly repeated 
original responses). Since nine (low expectancy-high per­
formance) minus 12.5 (low expectancy-low performance) more 
closely resembles a "strong" difference than does three (low) 
expectancy-high performance) minus 15 (low expectancy-low 
performance), it may be concluded that imperfect recall 
in achievement motivated low expectancy subjects tends to 
bias results in the direction of obtaining a significant 
"strong" difference.
It should be noted that arguments similar to the 
above could be constructed using intended response changes 
other than three and 15» as was used above. The outcome 
would remain the same, i.e., imperfect recall would tend to 
increase the number of response changes made by low expec­
tancy-high performance subjects, and decrease the number of 
response changes made by low expectancy-low performance 
subjects. For example, Intended response changes of zero 
(low expectancy-high performance) and ten (low expectancy- 
low performance) would, by similar reasoning, lead to expec­
ted response changes of ? and 8.5» respectively.
In summary, three interpretations can be applied to 
the three "strong" differences obtained in other studies 
(Aronson and Carlsmith, Brock et. al.) in support of disson­
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ance theory. First, demand characteristics may have resul­
ted in these differences being obtained. Second, the imper­
fect recall of achievement motivated low expectancy subjects 
could have biased results in the direction of obtaining 
significant "strong” differences. Finally, these "strong" 
differences could have been obtained as a result of disson­
ance reduction motivation. The evidence accumulated has 
been Insufficient to indicate or rule out any of the above 
interpretations, so that any or all of the above three var­
iables may have caused these three "strong" differences.
As was noted above, the dissonance reduction interpretation
ft
would now appear to be more tenuous, in view of the present 
study's failure, to obtain evidence for dissonance reduction 
by low achievement subjects.
Since three alternative interpretations exist for 
both "strong" and "weak" differences, the past and present 
research does not clearly demonstrate that subjects will 
sacrifice achievement in order to maintain consistency. The 
set of studies does provide strong evidence that achievement 
motivation affects the response changing behavior of subjects 
in this experimental situation.
Since only three "strong" and four "weak" differences 
have reached significance out of a total of 45 opportunities 
for such differences in 15 experiments, it may be concluded 
that significant "strong" and "weak" differences are diffi­
cult to produce experimentally. Also, the present study, 
which included conditions in which competing achievement
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motivation appeared to be minimal, provided evidence (per­
haps weakened by the less dissonant difference between high 
and low test scores') suggesting that any motivation to 
reduce dissonance in this experimental situation is non­
existent or negligible. If the motivation to sacrifice 
achievement to maintain consistency is either negligible or 
difficult to provide clear evidence for, then the importance 
of the consistency-seeking effect shown by the Aronson- 
Carlsmith study is severely limited.
The present experimenter was very much impressed by 
the complexity of the experimental situation. Subjects' 
attitudes appeared to vary greatly, e.g., apathy, boredom 
(sometimes accompanied by attempted sabotage), hostility 
toward the experimenter, great concern over the quality of 
performance on the experimental task, etc.. Subjects also 
varied greatly in the extent to which they indicated sus­
picion of deception by the experimenter, and the relation­
ship between the extent of their actual suspicion and their 
verbally indicated suspicion was not clear. In view of this 
complexity, the caveat of Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) is 
especially salient to this series of experiments; one set 
of results that are consistent with a dissonance theory 
prediction should not be considered sufficient evidence for 
a dissonance theory interpretation. A convergence of several 
sources of evidence (e.g., behavioral evidence, indirect 
measures, such as measuring discomfort, verbal reports, etc.) 
would be necessary in order to validate a dissonance theory
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interpretation.
Chapter V
SUMMABY
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) reported an experiment 
in which subjects were first allowed to develop strong expec­
tancies about the quality of their performances on a task, 
and then were allowed to change a performance of known qual­
ity. The results were interpreted as evidence that their 
subjects were motivated to reduce inconsistency in the qual­
ity of.performance (dissonance reduction motivation), as 
well as to improve the quality of performance (achievement 
motivation). -Subsequent similar research has produced ample
revidence for the achievement motivation interpretation, but 
few studies have obtained evidence supporting a dissonance 
reduction motivation interpretation.
The consistency of results supporting achievement 
motivation suggested that, in the studies not obtaining sup­
port for dissonance reduction motivation, subjects’ achieve­
ment motivation had been strong enough to prevent any dis­
sonance reduction motivation from affecting experimental 
results. The present study sought to systematicly vary 
achievement motivation, in order to investigate the hypo­
thesis that results favoring a dissonance reduction inter­
pretation would be obtained when achievement motivation was
55
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low. Subjects were divided into high and low achievement 
groups on the basis of Personality Research Form (Jackson, 
1967) scores. Half of each of these groups were told that 
the test was highly valid, and the other half were told that 
the test was of uncertain validity; this manipulation was 
supposed to increase (high validity statement) or decrease 
(uncertain validity statement) achievement motivation 
within each group.
Subjects were told to pick, from three faces on a 
card, the person whom they thought would later seek psych­
ological help. These cards were presented to subjects in 
five groups of twenty. There were no correct answers for 
the task, and-half of the subjects were assigned high 
scores on the-first four groups of cards (high expectancy 
condition), while the other half received low scores (low 
expectancy condition). Half of each of these groups 
received high scores on the fifth group of cards (high 
performance condition), and the other half of each group 
were assigned low scores on this last group (low perfor­
mance condition). Then subjects were given the opportunity 
to change the last performance, which may. have been con­
sistent or dissonant with the score that they had been led 
to expect. The response changes made at that time were 
used to infer either achievement motivation (e.g., low 
expectancy-high performance subjects changing few responses) 
or dissonance reduction motivation (e.g., low expectancy-* 
high performance subjects changing many responses).
5?
Other experimenters (Lowin and Epstein, 1965;
Waterman and Ford, 1965; Brock et. al., 1965) provided 
evidence that low expectancy subjects' recall of their 
responses on the last group was inferior to high expectancy
subjects' recall..It had been argued that these subjects' __
inferior recall could have produced the consistency-seeking 
effect reported by Aronson and Carlsmith. The present study 
included a measure of subjects' recall of their fifth group 
responses, both, as a means of adjusting each subject's 
response change for that subject's ability to recall his 
^former responses and in order to investigate whether similar 
recall results would be obtained from subjects appearing 
to be achievement motivated and from subjects appearing to 
be dissonance'reduction motivated.
The inferior recall of low expectancy subjects was 
confirmed under all experimental conditions in the present 
study. Results favoring an achievement motivation inter­
pretation were obtained, and there were no significant 
results suggesting a dissonance reduction motivation 
interpretation.
There was evidence suggesting that the low achieve­
ment group was minimally achievement motivated. Since 
no evidence for a dissonance reduction interpretation was 
obtained from these subjects, dissonance reduction motivation 
appeared to be nonexistant or negligible in the present study.
The present study used several dependent variables 
in order to provide several types of evidence for any inter-
pretatlon, and a questionnaire in order to check whether: 
the experimental conditions were associated with their 
desired effects. There was a convergence of evidence for ; 
the results reported above, and the experimental conditions
appeared to be associated with their desired effects. ■...
Two other interpretations were available for the 
results of other studies which supported a dissonance reduc­
tion motivation Interpretation. First, subjects may have 
concluded that consistency-seeking behavior would suit the 
purpose of the experimenter. Second, it was argued that 
the effects of imperfect and inferior recall in low expec­
tancy subjects could have biased results in the direction 
of confirmation of a dissonance reduction motivation inter- 
pretation. The available evidence was insufficient to hi
I -Iindicate or rule out these alternative interpretations. 
However, the consistency-seeking interpretation appeared to 
have become more tenuous, in view of the present study*s 
failure to obtain evidence for dissonance reduction by low 
achievement subjects. V~
It was concluded that the Aronson-Carlsmlth study’ 
and subsequent research have provided strong evidence for 
an achievement motivation interpretation, and inconclusive 
evidence for a. dissonance reduction motivation interpretation 
The difficulty encountered in replicating the,consistency- 
seeking effect of Aronson and Carlsmith has limited the .1 
importance of that effect. jh
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APPENDIX A 
Analysis of Variance Tables
Table 5 ^  ___
Analysis of Variance for Memory ./Corrected Change Scores
Meg. Rel.-Vs3.1. State. Pos. Rel.-Val. State.
High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf.
Hi A. Lo A. Hi A, Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A.
Hi Ex. 1.0 2. A l.k 2.3 O.k 1.8 , 2.0 3.0
Lo' Ex. -0.5 2.5 2.8 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.1
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Table 5— Continued 
Analysis of Variance for Memory Corrected Change Scores
Source of Variation Mean , Square F
Expectancy -........- O. 38 0.03
Achievement 64.70 5-38
Performance 5.70 0.47
Statement 1.76 0.15
Ach-Perf 20.32 1.69
Ach-State 2.26 ; 0.19
Perf-State 4.I3 . . 0.34
Exp-Ach . 1.32 , 0.11
Sxp-Perf 5.7 0 ' . 0.48
Exp-State 2.26 0019
Ach-Perf-State 1.76 0.15
Sxp-Ach-Perf 13.13 1.09
Exp-Ach-State 2.82 0.24
Exp-Perf-State 29.07 2.42
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 2.26 O.I9
Vi thin. Cell 12.02
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Change'from Memory Scores
O
Leg. Itel.-Val. State. Pos. riel.-Val. State.
High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf.
Hi A. Lb A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A . Lo A. Hi A. Lo A •
Si Ex. / 2.0 3.8 2.8 4 .0 3.2 h nur• { 2.0 3-3
Lo Ex. 2.9 4.3 3-5 2.8 3.4 3,6 1.8 2.4
Source of Variation O  w.ci x G
Expectancy O.03 *—{OO
Achievement 33.45 . 9.67
Performance 20.44 5.91
Statement . 3.12 0.90
Ach-Perf 0.8? 0.25
Ach-State 0.43 0.13
Perf-State 22.0? 6.38
Exp-Ach 13.41 . 3-88
Exp-Perf 0.41 0.12
Exp-State 1.98 0.57
Ach-Perf-State 7.72 2.23
Sxp-Ach-Perf 1.93 0.56
Exp-Ach-State 0.09 0.03
Hxp-Perf-State 4.05 1.17
Exp-Ach-Perf-3ta te 0.83 0.24
Aithin cell 3-46
Table ?
' Analysis, of Variance for Memory Change Scores
Neg. Rel.-Val. State. Pos. Rel.-Val. State.
High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf.
ill X L Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. JuO 3̂»
Hi Ex. 2.0 2.8 2. 8 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.9 2 .6
Lo Ex. 4.4 4.1 2.8 3.6 3.1 2.3 3-3 3.1
Source of Variation Viean pSquare
iExpectancy 16.52 6.26
Achievement 0.00 0.00
Performance 0.00 0.00
Statement 3-78 1.43
Ach-Perf 0.50 0.19
Ach-State 3-78 1.43
Perf-State 3-78 1.43
Exp-Ach 0.28 0.11
Exp-Perf 2-53 0.96
Exp-State 6.12 2.32
Ach-Perf-State 0.03 0.01
Exp-Ach-Perf 3-78 1.43
Exp-Ach-State 0.13 0.05
Exp-Perf-State 6.12 2.32
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 0.50 0.19
.4ithin Cell 2.64
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance for 10-card Change Scores
Neg. Rel.-Val. State. Pos. Rel.-Val. State
Hi Perf. Low Perf.- High Perf. Low Perf.
Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A.
Hi Ex. 3-5 3*6 3.^ 3.8 2.8 3.5 3.1 3.5
Lo Ex. 3-5 5-6 3-9 A. A 3-9 A.8 3-7
. J
3-7
------- ------
Source of Variation Square ^
Expectancy 18.76 5.A1
Achievement 11.88 3-A2
Performance 1.32 O.38
Statement 3.^5 0,99
Ach-Perf 2.82 0.81
iich-State O.38 0.11
Perf-State 0.07 0.02 .
Exp-Ach „ 2.82 0.81
Exp-Perf 3-65 0.99
Exp-State 0.20 0.06
Ach-Perf-State- 0.01 0.00
Exp-Ach-Perf A.13 1.19
Exp -A ch -S ta t e 2.82 0.81
Exp-Perf-State 0.0? 0.02
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 0.95 0.2 7
within Cell 3-^7
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance for 20-card Change Scores
.. ---------  - ..........
Neg. Rel.-Val. State Pos. Rel.-Val. State
High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low Perf.
Hi ..A. Lo' A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A.
Hi Ex. 5.0 7-9 6.9 8.0 ■5-7 6.8 7.8 8.3
Lo Ex. 8.3 10.6 8.3 . 9-1 7.4- 8.9 7-5 8.4
Source of Variation Mean poquare
Expectancy 75.03 9.18
Achievement 63.28 7.75
Performance 7.03 0. 36
Statement 6.13 0.75
Ach-Perf ' 10.13 : 1.24
Ach-State 5.28 0.65
Perf-State 3-78 0.46
Exp-Ach 0.00 0.00
Exp-Perf 28.13 3.44
Exp-State 11.28 1.38
Ach-Perf-State 2.00 0.24
Exp-Ach-Perf 0.03 0.00
Exp-Ach-State 1.13 0.14
Exp -F e r f -3 ta t e 0.13 0.02
Exp - A ch - P e r f - 3 ta t e 0.03 0.00
All thin Cell 8.17
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Table 10 ■
Analysis of Variance for the Item, "Circle the Score
That You Feel You ’Would Obtain On Another .
20 Cards of the Social Sensitivity Scale"
Neg. IJ e l.-V a l. S tate . Pos. R e l.-V a l. S ta te .
High r e r f . Low P erf. High P e rf. ■Low P erf.
H i A. Lo ■ A. Hi A. Lo A.. Hi A. L O  A. r i  X A • Lo A .
b i E x .. 11.5 11.3 12.0 10.9 11.6 11.0 9-8 11.8
Lo E x .
i 3.3.... - ... . .... i J 8.4 3.8 7.8 9.1 7.6 9-5 ........ . .7.6
. Source of Variation F
Expectancy 354.44 117.30
Achievement 2.26 0.75
Performance • 0.70 O.23
Statement 0.63 0.21
Ach-Perf - 1.75 ' 0.53
Ach-State 2.26 0.75
Perf-State 0.0 7 0.02
Exp-Ach 3.45 1.14
Exp-Perf 3.45 1.14
Exp-State 0. 38 0.13
Ach-Perf-State. 2.26 0.75
Exp-Ach-Perf 2. 32 0.76
Exp-Ach-State 18.76 6.21
Exp-Perf-State 17.26 5*72
Exp - A ch -P e r f —3 ta t e 4.13 1. 36
Hi thin Cel.:
C\!O
Table 11
Analysis of Variance for the Items "How Important
Was It for You To Do Well on the
Social Sensitivity Scale”
Reliability-vali.dity
—— ---- - ----------statement
Achievement
Negative Positive
High 3-5 ^•3
Low A.l 5*3
Summary of Analysis 
of Variance
Source, of* 
Variation
Mean_
square
F—
'/  y . .
Achievement 21.85 7*32
Statement 33*00 11.0A
Achievement by 
statement
1.76 0.59
Within cell 2.99
Table 12
'Analysis of Variance for the Item, “Circle the Score.
That You Would Like To Obtain on Another 20 Cards
of the Social Sensitivity Scale”
Achievement
Reliabili ty-vali d i ty 
statement
Negative Positive
High 14.9 16.4
Low 13-3 13.8
Summary
of
of Analysis 
Variance
Source of 
variation
Mean
square
F
Achievement 144.50 10.19
Statement 32.00 2.25
Achievement 
statement
by 6.I3 0.43
'Within cell 14.16
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Table 13
Analysis of-Variance for the.Item,:"Did You Find
the Social Sensitivity Scale Enjoyable?"
Neg. Rel.-Val. State. Pos. Rel.-Val. State.
-High Perf.-- lovj Perf. •High Perf. Low Perf.—
Hi A . Lo A . Hi A. Lo A. Hi A, Lo A « Hi A. Lo A.
Si Ex. 5.0 3.8 A. 3. A. 3 ■ 3.6 a . 1 r A. 9 5.0
UO - iiX • A. 5 5.0 A.O 5 ^ 3.6 5.1 A. 5 5*5,
„ TT . , . Mean. „source. . o n a n a t i m .  , Souare F
Expectancy 3-78 1.26
Achievement 7.03 2.28
Performance A. 50 1.50
Statement 0.03 0. 01
Ach-Perf 0.78 0,26
Ach-State 3.13 1. 0A
Perf-State 7.03 2 . 3A
Sxp-Ach ’ 12.50 A.05
Exp-Perf 0.28 0.09
Exp-State ' 0.13 0.0A
Ach-Perf-State A. 50 1.50
Exp-Ach-Perf 0.13 0.0A
Exp-Ach-State 0.78 0.26
Exp-Perf-State 0.50 0.17
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 0.31 0.01
iithin Cell 3-09
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Table I k
Analysis of Variance For the Item, "Do You Feel That
the Social Sensitivity Scale Is a Good Test?"
_ . --
Neg. Rel.-Val. State.
High Perf. Low Perf. High Perf. Low. Perf. . . ~
Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A.
Hi Ex/ k'5 k.6 6. k 5-9 6 1 5-0 A. 8
Lo Ex. - 5-8 5-8 6.0 6.6 3-6 5*4 5-5 6.3
Source of Variation Square F
Expectancy 12.50 3.19
Achievement 2.00 0.51
Performance- - 32.00 . 8.16
Statement 19,53 4.98
Ach-Perf 0.28 0.0?
Ach-State 1.13 O.29
Perf-State 0.13 0.03
Exp-Ach 9.03 b 2.30
Exp-Perf 0.13 0.03
Exp-State 0.13 0.03
Ach-Perf-State 0.28 0.07
Exp-Ach-Perf 0.00 0.00
Exp-Ach-State 2.53 0.65
Exp-Perf-State 7.03 1.80
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 3.13 0.80
iithin Cell 3.92
-
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Table 15
- Analysis of Variance For the Item, "Do You Feel That You
Are Good At Taking the Social Sensitivity Scale?"
------ -----
Neg. Rel.-Val. State.
High Perf. Low Perf.' High Perf.. Low Perf. ..
Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A. Hi A. Lo A.
Si Ex. ' 5-1 5-4 5-3 5.0 4.4 A. 3 5-3 5-4
Lo Ex. 7*5 7.1 7.1 7-5 6.3 7-3 6.1 7.0
Source of Variation Square F
Expectancy 168.82 93.27
Achievement 1.75 0.97
Performance 0.94 0.51
Statement 8.51 1. n AH* • ( KJ
Ach-Perf 0.07 0.0A
Ach-State 1.75 0.97
Perf-State 3.45 1.91
Exp-Ach ! • 1.75 0.97
Exp-Perf
<
2.26 1.25
Exp-State 0.63 0.34
Ach-Perf-State 0.01 0.00
Exp-Ach-Perf O.38 0.21
Exp-Ach-State 1.75 0.97
Exp-Perf-State 3.45 1.91
Exp-Ach-Perf-State 1.32 0.73
tfithin Cell 1.81
. . .....
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APPENDIX 3 
Results of 'Pilot Experimentation
Initially the majority of subjects indicated strong 
disbelief in the experimenter *s statements. Pilot exper­
imentation led to the following changes from the Aronson- 
Carlsmith procedure. Increased rationale for the test was 
given,- and a shorter positive reliability-validity state­
ment was used. Subjects v/ere instructed to pick out the 
person who later sought psychological help, rather than 
the “schizophrenic". High and low expectancy conditions 
were changed' from 83% correct and. 20̂ 3 correct to 60/5 
correct and 30% correct. Finally, a “broken" timer was 
replaced by a stopwatch that was "not started", and the 
retest procedure supposedly had the sanction of a more 
knowledgeable consultant. After these changes were insti­
tuted, about 85/S of the subjects indicated belief in the 
experimenter's statements.
A problem encountered during pilot experimentation 
was that subjects' response changes on the fifth 20-card, 
group were almost negligible, so that obtaining group 
differences would have been extremely difficult. First to 
be investigated was the hypothesis that the extent to 
which the three faces on each card appeared to be equally
?2
pathological to subjects may have been related to the ex­
tent to which subjects changed their responses on that 
card. The extent to which the three faces on each card 
appeared to be equally pathological was operationally 
defined in the' following.'manner. For each card in the last 
20-card group, a score was assigned to each face, i.e., the 
number of subjects who chose that face for their original 
response (subject n=l2). The sum of the squares of these 
three scores were calculated for each card. Each of these 
sums was assumed to be an ordinal measure of the extent to 
which the three faces on a card appeared to be equally 
pathological to those 12 subjects, where a lower sum indi­
cated more equally pathological faces. The extent to 
which subjects changed their responses on a card was oper­
ationally defined as the number of subjects who changed 
their responses on that card.
A product-moment correlation was calculated for 
the 20 pairs of scores measuring the above variables on 
each card. The reasoning underlying the hypothesis under 
consideration implied that a negative correlation would be 
obtained. The correlation was not significant and was 
so low (-.13) that it was concluded that the above hypo­
thesis was not a useful approach to the problem of neg­
ligible response changes.
A second approach to the above problem was the 
hypothesis that the extent to which subjects were able to 
correctly remember their original response on each card
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may have been related to the extent to which subjects changed 
their responses on that card. This hypothesis was suggested 
by the observation that a certain response 011 one card 
seemed to be easily recalled by subjects. The extent to 
which subjects were able to correctly remember their _ 
original response on a card was operationally defined as 
the number of subjects making a correct recall response on 
that card (subject n=12). This score was assumed to be 
an ordinal measure of the above variable, such that a 
lower score indicated that greater difficulty was encoun- 
 ̂tered in attempting to recall the original response. The 
extent to which subjects changed their responses on a card 
was operationally defined in the same manner as above.
A product-moment correlation was obtained for the 
20 pairs of scores measuring the above two variables. A"' - 
negative correlation Was expected. Again a small, non- 
significant correlation (-.07) was obtained, and the hypo­
thesis was rejected. The fact that the ordinal measure 
that was employed in the above two correlations was a vio­
lation of an assumption necessary in order to use the 
product-moment correlation coefficient was not considered 
to be a problem, since the use of a rank order correlation 
coefficient would have also produced nonsignificant 
results and also led to rejection of the hypothesis.
A third approach to the problem of negligible re­
sponse change involved investigating the relationship 
between each subject’s recall on each card and whether
?k
that subject changed his response on that card. While 
the above two approaches related properties which were 
empirically determined across subjects for each card to 
the total number of response changes made by all subjects, 
the present approach related individual recall perfor­
mances on each card to individual response changes. A 
2x2 contingency table was used to test for association be­
tween recall response (right or wrong) and response change 
(same or different) for each subject (n=ll) on each of the 
last ten cards for which both recall and response change 
were measured (See Table 16.).
•
'' "v Table 16
A Table of Joint Frequency of;Response Recall 
and Response Change for Each of Ten 
Cards for Eleven Subjects
Response Change
Response Recall
Right Wrong
Same 79 k
Different 11 16
A go-odness-of-fit test was used (Hayes, 1963» 
p. 582) and a chi-square of AO.^9 was obtained (p<.00l). 
It was concluded that response recall and response change 
were not independent. If response recall was correct,
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response change \\ras less probable, while if response recall 
was incorrect, response change was more probable. -b . - 
The. above result suggested, that the number of 
response changes could be increased if response recall 
could' be decreased. Decreasing subjects1 recall of respon- 
' ses was achieved by incres„sing the time interval between the 
initial and final contact v^ith the fifth 20-card, group. ' 
This interval was increased,by introducing the consultation 
xtfith the "authority" and the subsequent waiting period, as 
' described in Chapter II. ' After increasing this time inter­
val, average response change increased to a satisfactory;.
; level.
As noted earlier, the achievement scale of the PRF 
vxas used to separate subjects into high and low achieve­
ment groups. Table 17, based upon data from 5̂ - subjects, x
Table 17
A Performance by Achievement (PRF Achievement Scale) 
Summary Table with. Mean Memory Corrected Change 
Scores for the First 5^ Subjects
Achievement
Performance
High ■ Low
High 1.21 3.I3
Lovj 0.b8 2.50
7 6
indicated that the PRF achievement scale did not differ-' 
entiate well hetween those subjects apparently attempting 
to obtain a superior performance and those subjects appar­
ently not attempting to obtain a superior performance.
Both achievement groups apparently attempted to Improve 
their performances as indicated, by the increases in response 
change under the low performance conditions. These results 
indicated that the PRF achievement scale did not clearly 
differentiate between high and low achievers on the exper­
imental task.
A similar table was prepared by differentiating 
subjects into high and low achievement groups according to 
their scores on the affiliation scale of the PRF. Table 18 
indicated that the PRF affiliation scale differentiated 
between those subjects apparently attempting to improve
■ Table 18
A Performance by Achievement (PRF Affiliation Scale) 
Summary Table with Mean Memory Corrected Change 
Scores for the First 5^ Subjects
Achievement
Performance
High Low
High 0.70 3.^0
Low 1.63 1*43-
their performance from those subjects apparently nothf
' *  H
attempting to improve their performance. -..High achievers .
frjf
in Table 18 apparently attempted to improve their perfor:-;..:’ 
mances under the low performance condition," changing''! 
significantly more responses (p <. 05) under that condition
■ v*than under the high performance condition.. Low achievement 
subjects apparently did not attempt to improve their/perfor- 
mances under the low performance condition, since thbse 
subjects did not change more responses than low achievement 
subjects under the high performance condition. These "'
results suggested that the PRF affiliation scale shouldIfbe used to differentiate between high and low achievers.
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APPISI'IDIX C 
Que s t i onna i es
Questionnaire 1
'Circle the number.which most' closely Indicates your .ans- / 
wer to each question.
1. How important was. it for you to do well on the Social . 
Sensitivity Scale?
o
. very ■ not at all
'7 VI- important important
2.- Circle the score that you..would like to. obtain on 
another 20 cards of the Social Sensitivity Scale.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
3. Circle the -score: that you. feel you. would obtain on 
. another 20. cards of-, the Social ..Sensitivity .Scale.
Q 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
4. Did you find the Social Sensitivity Scale enjoyable?
1 g_ 3_. - 4 5 6 ,7 8 9very very
. enjoyable ’ uhenjoyable
5« Do you feel that the Social Sensitivity Scale is a 
good test?
■ -1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very good very poor
test test
6. Do you feel that you are good at .taking the Social 
Sensitivity Scale?
-3 ^ V  6 7 8- o
very very
good bud
Questionnaire 2
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1. Tell briefly what you think the experiment was 
about.
2. Describe what you thought about during the ex­
periment.
3* Doe's what we.,ve‘"done differ from what you expected? 
If so, how?
Was there anything that struck you as being con­
fusing or otherwise unusual? What?
5« Tell me what you'think that I want to show with 
this experiment.
6. During the experiment, did you ever suspect that 
the purpose of the experiment was other than what 
you were told that it was? If so, when?*
7. Have you ever seen any of the faces on the test 
cards before? During the experiment, did you ever 
suspect that the cards may have been home-made?
8. On the. last group of cards you received a _____ .
Was there any reason to question that score at 
that time?
9* when you were baking the test over and pretending 
that you had never seen the cards before, about 
how many answers do you think that you may have 
changed?
10. Think back to the time when you were taking the
test over, pretending that you had never seen the 
cards before. At that time, did any thought 
similar to this occur to you; that you should 
try to obtain a score that is consistent with the 
scores that you had been getting all along on the 
test? If so, did you want to be consistent for 
yourself, or so that my experiment would get con­
sistent results? At the time when .you were pre­
tending that you had never seen the cards before, 
did any thought similar to this occur to you: 
that you should try to get a better score on the 
test?
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